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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action in which Respondent, Mark Robert 
Gilleland, seeks a money judgment against defendant, Sandwich 
World, Inc., a Utah corporation, and George Jacobs, an 
individual. 
II. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On August 29, 1979, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist granted 
a default judgment against defendant, Sandwich World, Inc., 
(hereinafter Sandwich World) and defendant-appellant, George 
Jacobs (hereinafter Appellant). On October 22, 1979, Appellant 
filed a motion to vacate the default judgment which was entered 
against Appellant in his individual capacity. Appellant also 
challenged Respondent's complaint on the basis of improper 
jurisdiction, defective summons, and improper venue. 
In a decision handed down November 20, 1979, Judge 
Wahlquist denied Appellant's motion to vacate the default 
judgment, and concluded that there was no excusable neglect on 
Appellant's part in failing to answer the complaint within the 
20-day period of time. The court further found that the 
Appellant intentionally participated in a "definite program" 
which was designed to stall any collection efforts and that 
such was "proved by circumstantial evidence beyond any 
reasonable doubt be his intent." (R. 54: 2). The court also 
denied Appellant's objections to jurisdiction, improper 
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summons, and venue. (R. 54) on December 31, 1979, Judge 
Wahlquist reheard Appellant's motions and issued a memorandum 
decision affirming his earlier ruling. 
III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a decision of this court vacating the 
default judgment on the basis of appellant's excusable neglect 
and inadvertence. No injustice would result if a trial on the 
merits were held to determine Appellant's individual 
liability. Appellant also seeks a decision of this court 
vacating the default judgment and ordering a change of venue to 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, state 
of Utah. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 2, 1977, Respondent entered into a "Franchise 
Agreement" with Sandwich World. (R. 4). At that time, 
Appellant, had no interest in Sandwich World. Almost one and 
one-half years later -- in January of 1979 -- Appellant 
purchased an ownership interest in Sandwich World, and became 
its president (R. 86: 14-23; 85: 1-6). 
During the spring of 1979, Sandwich World received demands 
from Respondent by and through Respondent's attorney, Mr. 
Darrell Renstrom, for monies which Respondent claimed were owed 
by Sandwich World. Appellant, acting as president of Sandwich 
World, rejected Respondent's demands. (R.44). On May 17, 1979, 
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Respondent initiated a lawsuit for breach of contract against 
Sandwich World. (R. 1) The suit was initiated in the district 
court of Weber County, state of Utah (R. 1). Attached to the 
Respondent's complaint was a copy of the "Franchise Agreement" 
which Respondent claimed was breached by Sandwich World, Inc. 
(R. 4-12). 
(R. 10: 17) 
Paragraph 17 of that agreement states: 
Venue of all proceedings relating to 
the provisions hereof shall be Salt 
Lake County, state of Utah. 
Later, on June 28, 1979, Respondent filed an "Amended 
Complaint" naming Appellant in his individual capacity as a 
defendant to be liable to Respondent for the debts of Sandwich 
World. (R.14-16). On August 7, 1979, a Salt Lake County deputy 
sheriff served a summons and amended complaint upon Appellant. 
(R. 17) 
On or about August 20, 1979, Appellant delivered the 
summons and amended complaint to Richard J. Lawrence, Esq., and 
requested that Mr. Lawrence file an answer. (R. 33: 1). Before 
the 20-day period in which to answer had expired, Mr. Lawrence 
telephoned Respondent's counsel, Mr. Renstrom, on two or three 
occasions and left messages with counsel's secretary to the 
effect that Mr. Lawrence desired an extension of time in which 
to file the answer on behalf of Appellant with a request that 
Mr. Renstorm's secretary return Mr. Lawrence's call should 
there be any problems. (R. 118; 19-26; 117: 28-30; 112: 9-14; 
33: 3) 
-4-
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On August 29, 1979, Respondent obtained a default judgment 
against Sandwich World, and Appellant in his individual 
capacity. (R. 22) Later that same day, Mr. Renstrom telephoned 
Mr. Lawrence long-distance and at his own expense. Mr. 
Lawrence was with clients and unable to take the call. Mr. 
Renstrom did not feel like pursuing the matter further. (R. 
118: 5-8; 118: 14-19) 
On or about September 4, 1979, Mr. Lawrence telephoned 
counsel for Respondent and was informed that Respondent had 
obtained a default judgment against Appellant. (R. 40: 13) 
During that conversation, Mr. Lawrence requested that Mr. 
Renstrom vacate the default judgment. Mr. Renstrom refused. 
(R. 40: 13) Mr. Lawrence thereupon transferred the case to the 
litigation department of the law firm with which he had 
recently become associated. (R 112: 19-26). 
On October 4, 1979, a supplemental order was issued by the 
district court requiring Sandwich World and Appellant to appear 
in court and answer questions under oath concerning their 
assets. Before the supplemental order was served, Appellant, 
filed a motion to vacate the default judgment dismiss 
Respondent's amended complaint, and change venue to the 
District Court for Salt Lake County. (R. 23-34) Four days 
later, the supplemental order was served upon Sandwich World 
and Appellant. (R. 36) 
On October 24, 1979, Appellant filed a motion to continue 
the supplemental order for the reason that the district court 
-5-
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had not yet rendered a decision on Appellant's prior motions to 
vacate the default judgment and dismiss the complaint. (R. 37) 
On October 29, 1979, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist denied 
Appellant's motion to continue the supplemental order. (R. 46; 
106: 18-22) During the supplemental hearing, Appellant was 
required to answer questions regarding his personal assets and 
the assets of Sandwich World. At that time, it was agreed 
between counsel that Appellant's prior motion to vacate the 
default judgment, dismiss the complaint and change venue would 
be decided by the district court based upon the affidavits and 
papers which had previously been filed with the district court. 
(R. 46-107: 7-13 
On November 13, 1979, Judge Wahlquist issued findings of 
fact and conclusions of law (R. 47-49) and on November 20, 
1979, issued a memorandum decision denying Appellant's motion 
to vacate the default judgment, dismiss and change venue. (R. 
50-54) Appellant thereupon made a motion for a rehearing which 
was granted by the district court. (R. 57-58) 
On December 31, 1979, Appellant's motion for rehearing of 
Appellant's prior motions was heard. In a memorandum decision 
dated January 8, 1980, Judge Wahlquist affirmed his prior 
denial of appellant's motions to vacate the default judgment 
and to dismiss the complaint. (R. 63-66). Later, on January 
21, 1980, Judge Wahlquist issued his corresponding findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. (R. 67-70) 
-6-
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ARGUMENT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
In Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 
1962), this court stated: 
Judgments by default are not favored by 
the courts nor are they in the interest 
of justice and fair play. 
That same year, in Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 
951, 952 (Utah 1962), this court added: 
It is fundamental to our system of 
justice that each party to a 
controversy should be afforded an 
opportunity to present his side of the 
case. For that reason, it is quite 
uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is 
reasonable justification or excuse for 
the defendant's failure to appear, and 
timely application is made to set it 
aside. (Emphasis added) 
A. Appellant has a reasonable justification or excuse for 
failing to file an answer within the 20-day time period. 
Applying the language of Mayhew v. Standard Lutsonite Co., 
supra, Appellant contends that he was reasonably justified or 
excused for failing to appear within the 20-day period of time 
in which to answer the complaint. On August 7, 1979, Appellant 
was served with a summons and amended complaint. (R.17) On or 
about August 20, 1979, Appellant contacted Richard Lawrence, 
Esq., for the purpose of answering Respondent's amended 
complaint. (R. 33: 1) In an affidavit, Mr. Lawrence stated 
-7-
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that he contacted counsel for Respondent, Mr. Darrell Renstrom, 
to "request an extension of time in which to file an answer to 
plaintiff's amended complaint and left messages to that 
effect." (R. 33: 3) In a hearing before the district court, 
Mr. Lawrence stated: 
I had called two or three times prior 
to the time when a default could have 
been taken and left messages for my 
calls to be returned. They were not. 
Then, even another time I called prior 
to the time when a default could have 
been taken and left a message of what 
the call was about and indicated to the 
secretary to contact me if there was a 
problem with that. That was prior to 
the time the default could have been 
taken. 
{R. 118: 19-26; see also R. 117: 28-30; 112: 9-14.) 
Mr. Renstrom challenged part of Mr. Lawrence's statements 
by declaring: 
{R. 118: 3-5.) 
I received a call from Mr. Lawrence at 
Salt Lake with none of the information 
indicated. 
In light of Mr. Lawrence's testimony, Appellant alleges 
that it is very possible that the secretary that took the 
messages for Mr. Renstrom may not have written down the full 
extent of Mr. Lawrence's message regarding the request for an 
extension of time. 
After the default was obtained, Mr. Renstrom attempted to 
contact Mr. Lawrence. However, Mr. Lawrence was not available 
to take the call. (R. 40: 12). Mr. Renstrom stated that, "The 
-8-
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long-distance call was at my expense and I didn't feel like 
pursuing whatever he was calling about." (R. 118: 5-8). 
It was not until September 4, 1979, that the parties were 
able to communicate. It was on that occasion that Mr. Lawrence 
was informed that a default judgment had been obtained against 
Appellant. (R. 40: 13) During the whole period of time during 
which Mr. Lawrence was attempting to contact Mr. Renstrom, and 
in which Mr. Lawrence was leaving messages with Mr. Renstrom's 
secretary, it was Mr. Lawrence's belief that an extension of 
time would be granted. (R. 112: 15-18) 
The case is one of a classic communication problem between 
counsel. The communication problem was one of excusable 
neglect and inadvertence as defined by Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Lawrence acted reasonably in a 
belief that his client would be given an extension of time to 
file an answer. Certainly, it would be unfair to saddle the 
Appellant with an $11,000 judgment without a trial where 
Appellant has an excellent defense to the theory of liability 
presented by Respondent (i.e. that Respondent's contract was 
with Sandwich World and was executed prior in time to 
Appellant's involvement with Sandwich world. Appellant never 
entered into a contract with Respondent.) 
-9-
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B. Appellant made timely application to vacate the default 
judgment. 
The second consideration articulated in Mayhew v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., supra, is that the motion to vacate the default 
judgment must be filed in a timely fashion. Appellant filed a 
motion to vacate the default judgment on October 11, 1979. (R. 
23) The motion to vacate the default judgment was filed 
approximately 40 days after the judgment was rendered. This is 
well within the three month time requirement provided in Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Respondent will not be substantially prejudiced and no 
injustice would result if a trial on the merits were held 
to determine appellant's liability. 
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul w. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) this court 
stated: 
The very reason for the existence of 
courts is to afford disputants an 
opportunity to be heard and to do 
justice between them. In conformity 
with that principle, the courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief 
from default judgments where there is 
any reasonable excuse, unless it will 
result in substantial prejudice or 
injustice to the adverse party. 
For reasons already articulated in Argument I.A. above, 
Appellant has shown a reasonable excuse for failing to file an 
answer within the 20-day period of time. Certainly, Respondent 
would not be substantially prejudiced and no injustice would 
-10-
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result if the default judgment rendered against Appellant were 
vacated. At no time has Appellant become individually involved 
in any manner whatsoever with Respondent. Respondent entered 
into a "Franchise Agreement" with Sandwich World, and not with 
Appellant. (R. 4) Over one and one-half years after Respondent 
executed this agreement, Appellant became involved with 
Sandwich world, Inc. (R. 86: 14-18) This fact was understood 
by counsel for Respondent. (R. 85: 1-6) In spite of counsel's 
understanding, counsel referred to Appellant as a "franchise 
artist," and accused him of "ripping off Respondent." (R. 116: 
24-28) However, Appellant, at no time "guaranteed or promised 
to perform any obligations or assume any debt or obligation in 
connection with the agreement entered into between plaintiff 
Respondent and Sandwich World, Inc." (R. 32: 7) 
Appellant became president of Sandwich World long after 
Respondent was "ripped off." (R. 86: 14-18) In a short six 
months' time, Appellant lost $25,000-$30,000 as a result of 
misrepresentations of the prior president of Sandwich world 
(Douglas Goff), who sold the corporation to Appellant. (R. 101: 
6-23) 
Given these facts, it would be patently unfair to allow a 
default judgment to remain intact against Appellant in his 
individual capacity. Respondent would not be substantially 
prejudiced if a trial on the merits were held to determine if 
Appellant is individually liable to Respondent. Throughout 
this case, Respondent has failed to show and cannot now show 
-11-
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any injustice or substantial prejudice which would be 
perpetrated upon him if these issues are determined at a trial 
on the merits. 
ARGUMENT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In determining whether to grant a motion to set aside a 
default judgment, the Utah courts are to resolve all doubts in 
favor of the moving party so that cases may be decided on their 
merits. In Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 
1033, 1036 (Utah 1898) this court stated: 
Where the circumstances which led to 
the default are such as to cause the 
court to hesitate, it is better to 
resolve the doubt in favor of the 
application, so that a trial may be 
secured on the merits. 
Recently, in Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 
1977), this court rearticulated the same rule: 
Relief in doubtful cases generally will 
be granted so a party may have a 
hearing. 
Notwithstanding this general rule, the district court 
consistently refused to resolve doubts in favor of Appellant's 
motion to vacate the default judgment. Instead, all doubts 
were resolved in the Respondent's favor. 
-12-
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A. Doubts regarding Mr. Lawrence's attempts to obtain an 
extension of time for filing an answer on behalf of 
Appellant were not resolved in favor of Appellant. 
The court erroneously concluded that no excusable neglect 
existed and that Appellant's failure to file an answer before 
the default judgment was obtained "was deliberate, in an 
attempt to frustrate the proceedings". (R. 69: 2) In fact the 
court found in its first decision that Jacob's attempts to 
"stall collection efforts" were "provided by circumstantial 
evidence beyond any reasonable doubt." (R. 54:2). The facts, 
however, are not as clear as the district court stated. 
Numerous doubts arise from the testimony of Mr. Renstrom and 
Mr. Richard Lawrence regarding Mr. Lawrence's attempts to gain 
an extension of time in which to file an answer on behalf of 
appellant. The court failed to resolve these doubts in favor 
of Appellant's motion to vacate. 
Mr. Lawrence testified that he called Mr. Renstrom's office 
on two or three occasions prior to the time when the default 
judgment could have been rendered and left messages for calls 
to be returned Mr. Lawrence testified that on at least one 
occasion, he left a message regarding the nature of his call, 
and instructed Mr. Renstrom's secretary to contact Mr. Lawrence 
if there .was any problem regarding the grant of an extension of 
time in which to file an answer. (R. 118: 19-26; see also R. 
117: 26-30; 112: 9-14; 33: 3). In contrast, Mr. Renstrom 
indicated that he received only one telephone message from Mr. 
-13-
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Lawrence and that this message was received on August 29, 1979. 
(R. 40: 12; 118: 3-6) 
There was a substantial controversy regarding the number of 
telephone calls which Mr. Lawrence made to Mr. Renstrom and 
whether Mr. Lawrence left messages with Mr. Renstrom's 
secretary regarding the nature and purpose of Mr. Lawrence's 
telephone call. The importance of this factual resolution 
relates to whether excusable neglect or inadvertance existed on 
Mr. Lawrence's part in not filing the answer within the twenty 
day period. The court resolved all doubts in favor of 
Respondent and against Appellant's motion to vacate the default 
judgment. (R. 68: 7) 
B. The court erroneously found that Mr. Renstrom called Mr. 
Lawrence "collect" and that Mr. Lawrence "refused the call." 
The court erroneously found that "the plaintiff's attorney 
did attempt to return the call to the defense attorney. The 
plaintiff's attorney's offices is in Ogden, Utah and he placed 
the return call 'collect' to the defense attorney. The defense 
attorney refused the call." (R. 68: 7) 
Mr. Renstrom himself testified that his return call to Mr. 
Lawrence was not "collect" but was rather "at my expense and I 
didn't feel like pursuing whatever he was calling about." (R. 
118: 7-8; R. 119: 9-10) Nowhere in the record does Mr. 
Lawrence state that Mr. Renstrom's call was collect. 
The finding that the defense attorney refused the call is 
also unsupported by the evidence. The court specifically asked 
-14-
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Mr. Lawrence, "Did you refuse to take the call when it was 
tendered to you?" Mr. Lawrence responded, "No, your honor, I 
was not aware that a call came in until later when I received a 
slip from the secretary that a call had been made." (R. 118: 
12-16) Mr. Lawrence's testimony on the issue is absolutely 
corroborated by Mr. Renstrom. (R. 119: 10-15) 
The significance of these findings of fact is that they 
provided a basis upon which the court issued its conclusions·of 
law that there was no excusable neglect and that the failure of 
Appellant to answer was deliberate and in an attempt to 
frustrate the proceedings. (R. 69: 2-3) These underlying 
findings were erroneous, as well as the court's conclusions of 
law. 
C. Doubts regarding intentional delay by Appellant were not 
resolved in Appellant's favor. 
The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are replete with findings that Appellant intended to 
frustrate the proceedings and acted concertedly with that 
intent. (See R. 67: 3; 67: 5; 68: 9; 68: 11; 69: e-f; 69: 13; 
69: 3) 
The court, in referring to a May 1, 1979 telephone 
conversation between Appellant and Mr. Renstrom, found that 
"the individual defendant informed plaintiff's attorney that if 
such a suit were filed, the individual defendant would see to 
it that the lawsuit was frustrated, and that no recovery would 
be had." (R. 67: 3) The court makes no mention of the fact 
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)~ 
:t 
that the Appellant denied ever making such a statement to 
respondent's attorney. (R. 90: 18-23). 
The court's Finding of Fact No. 8 is absolutely and clearly 
erroneous. That Finding states: 
R. 68: 8 
The defense took no action at all 
until there was served a "supplemental 
proceeding" on the individual 
defendant to advance collection of the 
judgment against both the corporation 
and himself 
Nothing could be further fron the truth. The Respondent's 
motion and order in supplemental proceedings was signed by the 
district court on October 4, 1979. (R. 36) Before the 
supplemental order was served upon Appellant, Appellant filed a 
motion to vacate judgment, dismiss the complaint and change 
venue. This motion was filed on October 11, 1979. (R. 23) 
Four days later, on October 15, 1979, Appellant was personally 
served with the supplemental order. (R. 36) Appellant first 
received notice of the supplemental proceedings on the day on 
which he was served, October 15, 1979. Since Appellant's 
motion was filed before Appellant was werved with the 
supplemental order, the district court's Finding No. 8 is 
clearly erroneous and without ju~tification. 
The court's Finding No. 9 is also erroneous. Finding No. 9 
states: 
Immediately on the time for the 
scheduled supplemental proceeding, the 
individual defendant filed a motion to 
delay the supplemental proceeding and a 
further motion to set aside the default 
on the grounds of excusable neglect. 
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R. 68: 9. 
As already indicated above, Appellant filed a motion to set 
aside the default, as well as a motion to dismiss and change 
venue, on October 11, 1979 - eighteen days before the scheduled 
hearing of the supplemental proceeding. This motion to set 
aside the default and the motion to dismiss were not filed 
"immediately on the time for the scheduled supplemental 
proceeding" as erroneously stated by the court in its Finding 
No. 9. 
The court also erroneo~sly concluded in Finding No. 9 that 
"immediately on the time for the scheduled supplemental 
proceeding, the individual defendant filed a motion to delay 
the supplemental proceeding." (R. 68: 9) It is true that 
Appellant filed a motion for continuance of the supplemental 
proceedings. This motion, however, was received by the 
district court on October 24, 1979, five days before the 
scheduled supplemental proceedings. (R. 37) Further, the 
motion for continuance of the supplemental proceeding was based 
upon the grounds that Appellant's motion to vacate judgment and 
dismiss the complaint was presently pending before the district 
court and had not been formally ruled upon. (R. 37) The 
rationale of counsel for Appellant was that it would be 
improper and premature for the court to explore the assets of 
Appellant until the court had formally ruled upon Appellant's 
motion to vacate judgment and dismiss the complaint. It was 
never the intent of the Appellant or his counsel to delay and 
frustrate the proceedings. 
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The court's Finding No. 11-e was also resolved in favor of 
Respondent, even though substantial doubts were raised. That 
Finding states: 
R. 69: 11 
There was an effort made by defendant's 
attorney to cause it to appear that 
there was some justification for 
failure to file a timely answer, 
whereas none in fact exists. 
For reasons enunciated in Argument I. A. above, Appellant 
asserts that this finding is improper and that Appellant had a 
reasonable excuse for failing to file the answer within the 
20-day period. 
Finding 11 f is also improper. Finding 11-f states: 
R. 69: 11 f. 
The individual defendant's actions 
throughout the supplemental proceedings 
have been designed to frustrate the 
plaintiff's efforts to collect the 
judgment against the corporation 
defendant and against the individual 
defendant himself. This action has 
been a refusal to bring to court in a 
timely fashion materials subpoenaed, 
failure to answer questions that would 
normally be answerable by an informed 
corporation official, and a failure to 
timely disclose where such records were 
kept. 
The supplemental order which was served upon Appellant 
required Appellant to bring with them all records reflecting 
the assets of the parties which each has owned since September 
30, 1977, including accounts receiable, contracts, or any other 
document or evidence showing assets owned since said date, or 
at the present time, or assets either defendant is entitled to 
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receive in the future." R. 35-36. The provisions of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which address supplemental 
proceedings, do not mention or seem to allow for this type of 
order. (See Rules 69, k, 1, m, n, U.R.C.P.) 
However, assuming that the order was proper, Appellant did 
not have the Sandwich World records in his possession and 
experienced difficulty in obtaining them. Appellant stated, "I 
just did not have any records available to bring." (R. 89: 
2-3) Appellant explained that the corporation was abandoned, 
the corporate records were left at the corporate headquarters, 
and the Appellant "hurriedly" left the corporation 
headquarters. (R. 89: 16-30) Appellant stated that at the time 
he abandoned the corporate headquarters that he was in a 
"panicky" state of mind and that "everything was upside down" 
and "we weren't thinking exactly on a corporate level." (R. 90: 
14-17) Appellant explained that at the time, 
R. 92: 5-13. 
It wasn't a case of clear thinking, Mr. 
Renstrom. We were absolutely 
destitute. We had put all of what we 
owned - we had hocked our own jewelry 
to try to keep the company alive And 
at that time there was no thinking 
about corporate records or corporate 
checks or corporate anything. We just 
gave up. I have a coronary condition. 
I have had medical problems. And all 
of a sudden I am 54 years old and found 
out I've been taken, Mr. Renstrom. 
It would be manifestly unfair to do as the district court 
has done - refuse to vacate a default judgment against the 
Appellant because the Appellant was not "a normally informed 
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corporation official" and because Appellant abandoned the 
corporate records when he "hurriedly" left the corporate 
offices. 
In response to counsels questions, Appellant candidly 
admitted that he did not make his best efforts in obtaining the 
corporate documents once he had received the supplemental 
order. (R. 101: 24-29) However, Appellant did make some efforts 
to obtain the corporate records. He contacted Mr. Korth (R. 
89: 6-9). Appellant was unable to contact the previous 
president of Sandwich World, Mr. Goff, because Mr. Goff had 
been in New York training for another job. (R. 89: 9-12) 
At the hearing, Appellant promised to exercise his best 
efforts in immediately obtaining the corporate documents. (R. 
102: 3-11) At the next hearing on December 31, 1979, Appellant 
personally appeared in court and brought into court numerous 
corporate records. The corporate records were so voluminous 
that Mr. Renstrom attempted to have the records impounded for 
his prolonged investigation. (R. 121: 22-26) 
At the first hearing, Appellant was also required to answer 
questions regarding his personal property and assets. This 
Appellant did, in spite of the fact that the district court had 
not formally ruled upon his motion to vacate the default 
judgment. (R. 107-111} Appellant stipulated to an order that 
he would not divest himself of any real property which he owned 
in the state of California pending rsolution of this case. (R. 
111: 12-16) 
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The above discussion shows that important factual doubts 
were not resolved in Appellants favor as mandated by law. 
Important factual dbubts were systematically resolved in favor 
of Respondent. Should the doubts be resolved in favor of 
Appellant, the district court's conclusions the Appellant's 
failure to file timely answer was deliberate and that Appellant 
attempted to frustrate the proceedings are without foundation. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT WRONGFULLY REFUSED TO 
VACATE JUDGMENT AND ORDER A CHANGE OF VENUE 
Clause No. 17 of the "Franchise Agreement" to which 
Respondent is a signatory, states: 
R. 10: 17. 
Venue of all proceedings relating to 
the provisions hereof shall be Salt 
Lake County, state of Utah. 
The Franchise Agreement makes no mention that the contract 
was to be performed in Weber County, state of Utah. In spite 
of the specific contract provision that venue was proper only 
in Salt Lake County, state of Utah, and in spite of the 
contract 1 s failure to delineate Weber County as the place of 
performance, Respondent brought a lawsuit against Sandwich 
World and Appellant in the District Court for Weber County. 
Appellant is not a resident of Weber County but rather is a 
resident of Salt Lake County (R. 31: 2). 
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At no time has Appellant waived his right to demand a 
change of venue. On October 11, 1979, Appellant moved the 
court for an order changing venue to Salt Lake County. 
(R.28). Appellant made his demand upon his first appearance 
the action. Section 78-13-8, Utah Code Ann. 1953; Rudd v. 
Crown International, 488 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1971). 
in 
Venue was improper in the District Court for Weber County. 
The court erroneously denied Appellant his rights to have all 
matters concerning this lawsuit to be tried in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. On that basis, 
the default judgment in the district court for Weber County is 
void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60 (5) and (7) 
U.R.C.P. with an order that venue should be in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court abused its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the default judgment which was rendered against Appellant 
in his individual capacity. Appellant has a reasonable excuse 
for failing to file his answer within the 20-day period. 
Respondent can show no prejudice or injustice if a trial on the 
merits were held to determine whether Appellant is individually 
liable to Respondent. Many of the important factual doubts 
arising in this matter were not resolved in Appellant's favor. 
If those doubts were resolved in Appellant's favor the district 
court's refusals to vacate the default judgment would have been 
without any foundation. Finally, the district court erred in 
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refusing to order a change of venue to the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
DATED this 
,.,...,. 1 
~ , ... -, / ~ ...... 
I .·· ~,,. . ..-"day of April, 1980. 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
By !_V/J;~ 
~ent B. s9ott I ) 
I !: I /' 11 • I /, ( I I • /. </ . !. i . -1 --/ 11 ·/ --r--. I I 
By I I !r;_11 v tf;f ;7/? ~II t!lli 
Mi chae i ·--L. Hutchings . 
Attorneys for Appellant- J 
George Jacobs 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true copy.'rJ. the fore~ief of 
Appellant has been mailed, this ~day of , 
1980, to Mr. Darrell G. Renstrom, Suite 1, Richards Building, 
2640 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, 84401, attorney for 
respondent. 
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